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rank himself were often not very congenial to him -
the so-called economic underworld ofHobson, Gesell,
Major Douglas et al., against his natural world, the
academic mainstream economists. In the same way
Dudley Seers, towards the end of his life, argued
against the Brandt Report, against the principle of aid,
against charity in international relations. In one of his
last articles he proposed a new aid target of 0.1 per cent
of donors' GNP to which aid should be reduced; that,
of course, brought him acclaim from some very
unaccustomed and uncongenial allies from both right
and left about which he felt very unhappy. But he kept
saying this is what I believe in and I must say it.
Shared Perceptions of Nationalism
Perhaps a more substantive similarity lies in their
leaning towards a nationally-oriented policy of de-
linking or partial de-linking from the world economy.
Dudley's last book (which appeared posthumously)
was called The Political Economy of Nationalism; an
element of 'nationalism' is also a key characteristic of
Keynes' General Theory. This was the product of the
1930s, an era of heavy unemployment when
international relations had broken down in a wild
scramble of each-for-himself and beggar-my-neighbour
deflation. The World Economic Conference in
London in 1933, the last attempt to try to right the
Depression by means of international cooperation,
had collapsed. Keynes in his famous article in The New
Statesman in 1933, immediately following the collapse
of the London Conference, said that the time had
come when Great Britain as a nation must try to act on
her own to restore full employment at home, if
necessary by means of national self-sufficiency:
I sympathise, therefore, with those who would
minimise, rather than with those who would
maximise, economic entanglement between nations.
Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel - these
are things which should of their nature be
international. But let goods be home-spun
whenever it is reasonably and conveniently
possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily
national. Yet, at the same time, those who seek to
disembarrass a country of its entanglements should
be very slow and wary. It should not be a matter of
tearing up roots, but of slowly training a plant to
grow in a different direction.
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Seers and Keynes: Some Personal Analogies
There is no need to repeat here what was said at the
time of Dudley Seers' death about the great loss of a
friend and source of inspiration. Now the time has
come to take a little distance and try to appraise his
contribution to thinking about development. Perhaps
the best way I can think of trying to do this is by
relating his work and thinking to that of John
Maynard Keynes. To begin with, there are a number of
personal analogies and similarities between Dudley
Seers and Keynes, starting with the coincidental fact
that both of them died at almost exactly the same age,
almost to the day, both much too early, at the age of
62. Moreover, both of them died more or less on the
job, having had ample warning that their life was in
danger and knowing that they could probably have
prolonged it by withdrawing from strenuous work.
For both of them their sense of commitment and
fulfilment in what they had set themselves to do was so
great that they made their choice without much
hesitation; the consideration of extending their life
counted for very little in the scale against the
contribution to human progress they felt it in them to
make.
Both of them were at their best against the background
of the institutions with which they were associated.
They were both what you might call great collegial
men. Keynes was the heart and soul of his college:
when he was away one always knew it; when he was
there everything revolved around him. At some
periods in the ItS one had the same feeling about
Dudley Seers. Dudley was the soul and spirit of the
IDS, and much of his best work and best thinking was
done in the collegiate framework of teamwork within
the IDS. I am thinking here particularly of the ILO
Employment Missions, with which his name is
associated. I think also both men shared the
experience, for both of them a sad experience, of
having to challenge established views and to quarrel
with their natural allies and teachers. In the case of
Keynes,! am thinking here of the Keynes of the 1930s,
the author of the General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money. The General Theory for Keynes
was a break with his venerated teachers, with the
classics, with Marshall, with Pigou. He had to
challenge orthodoxies. The allies with which he had to
This is also the key theme of Dudley's last book. Like
the General Theory, it was 'a struggle of escape from
habitual modes of thought and expression'. Both of
them were accused of being unduly nationalist. In the
case of Keynes, during the Keynes centenary year
(1983), (this by the way is another link between the two
- that Dudley died in Keynes' centenary year) in the
contributions which The Economist published on that
occasion, Hayek was predictably very critical of
Keynes for being a nationalist. The other com-
mentators, Hicks, Samuelson, etc., also commented
on this fact, some approvingly and some critically.
Keynes of course, had the opportunity oftranscending
his nationalist phase of the 1930s. At Bretton Woods,
the Keynes of the 1940s had the chance to help to build
an international system which, if it had been
implemented in the way Keynes visualised it, would
have been of great benefit to world development. It
would probably have given us more than the 25 golden
years which we enjoyed under the Keynesian
consensus, even under the imperfect Bretton Woods
system which was finally created.
But both Dudley Seers and John Maynard Keynes
knew, or felt, that nationalism is not enough; both felt
the need for what Dudley called in his book 'extended
nationalism'. In the case of Keynes, there was not
much need to emphasise this: let us remind ourselves
that when Keynes said in the l930s that 'England can
go it alone', and restore full employment at home by
changing our policies, by changing our view of the way
the economy works and by acting according to this
new view - the 'England' that he was speaking of was
an economic superpower - it had half the world still
associated with it, including the whole Indian sub-
continent. Keynes took this for granted, and hence did
not worry too much about the balance of payments
effect which expansionist policies in the UK would
have; he took it for granted that he was really speaking
of half the world expanding together. Therefore, when
we call Keynes a nationalist, or when Keynes thought
he was acting and talking as a nationalist, in the
current meaning of the term, that is a statement that
one must considerably qualify. Similarly, Dudley
Seers felt the need, particularly in his last book, to say
that the UK cannot go it alone. We must dc-link from
the world economy to some extent; above all, we must
not be paternalistic, we must not believe that we have
the secret of telling other countries how to develop.
We can only look after ourselves but we must not do
this alone; we must do this as part of Europe. Hence
Dudley's last book presented a picture of the
possibility of a European regional bloc looking after
its own depressed areas. Just as Keynes wanted us to
look after the depressed areas ofEngland in the 1930s,
so Dudley Seers had the vision of a Europe that was
looking after its own periphery, and would then deal
as a regional bloc with countries outside Europe.
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I am struck by another analogy between Dudley Seers
and Keynes. Keynes says repeatedly in the General
Theory that he was looking for what he called a middle
way between capitalism and socialism. The macro-
economic management by the government of an
essentially capitalist economy, with full employment
as the top priority, was to him the essence of the
middle way. Such a 'guiding influence' of the state
could combine the advantages, or virtues, of
capitalism and socialism. This phrase, the middle way.
was then picked up by Keynes' good friend and
publisher, and future Prime Minister, Harold
Macmillan, in his book entitled The Middle Way, a
popular exposition of the Keynesian view that through
enlightened macroeconomic management and expan-
sionist policies you could gain the benefits of socialism
even in a capitalist economy. I remember vividly when
Keynes in the mid-1930s visited Russia and Sweden
and startled all of us on his return by saying that
during his visit he had found the country of true
socialism - Sweden. Sweden to him represented at
that time a good approximation of the middle way that
he was advocating. It is interesting to note that Dudley
Seers, in his last book, kept using the phrase 'the third
way': they both struggled to escape from sterile
debates and look for a promising synthesis.
Shared Interest in Quantification
Let me now turn to another shared interest of the two:
both were particularly concerned with what we may
call the quantification possibilities and data require-
ments for economic policies - the need for national
accounting systems of some kind, a framework that
would lend itself to quantification. In the case of
Keynes, of course, this led in the first place to his
collaboration with Colin Clark, who took the
Keynesian concepts and incorporated them in his
national accounting framework, a work then carried
on by Richard Stone.
Dudley Seers, as we know, was very active in
extending Richard Stone's analysis further in
directions in which he felt the Keynesian analysis, or
the conventional Keynesian analysis was deficient.
The Keynesian analysis led Harrod and Domar, as
well as Colin Clark, to put great emphasis in their
accounting system on physical capital accumulation,
which was subsequently transferred as policy models
and policy advice to developing countries. Like others,
Dudley Seers became very doubtful whether such an
identification of development with GNP growth and
of GNP growth with physical capital accumulation
was the most relevant or the most important thing
about economic development. Therefore, towards the
end of his life, he extended Richard Stone's framework
of national accounting through his publications on the
life cycle, relating it more directly to poverty, to
standards of living, to what we now call human
capital, to the human condition. It is quite in the spirit
of this major contribution that towards the end of his
life, he helped to lay the foundations for UNICEF to
move to a more humane - and at the same time more
productive - approach to the new adjustment
problems of the 1980s.
Here we have an unbroken intellectual chain which
leads from Keynes to Colin Clark, Richard Stone and
Dudley Seers. But at the same time, in his last book
Dudley Seers emphasises his differences from, rather
than his links with, Keynes. He stresses that the
conventional national accounting framework - and
by that he means Keynes, Harrod, Domar and Colin
Clark (but not Stone) - which now dominates the
statistical and planning systems ofso many developing
countries, as well as industrial countries, is a case of
the politicians and statesmen of today being the
unknowing victims of some defunct economist. This is
a way of turning the tables on Keynes - it refers to
Keynes' famous statement made in the concluding
sentences of the General Theoui in trying to explain
why the idea of the laissez-faire market automatically
providing full employment was still so widely accepted
in the minds of statesmen and the general public when
he started writing the book. In that famous passage
Keynes also spoke of 'madmen in authority', who
believe they hear voices in the air but are really only
repeating the ideas and writings ofa defunct academic
scribbler. Without mentioning him by name, Dudley
Seers hoists Keynes on his own petard by saying that
when thinking about national accounting we are still
the victims of a defunct economist, i.e. Keynes.
Keynes' Ideas and Developing Countries
In a number of ways Dudley Seers complemented
Keynes' work. Keynes himself was not particularly
interested in the application of his General Theory to
developing countries, about which he was not greatly
concerned. As far as I know he never visited a
developing country: indeed, even though his early
career before the war was in the India Office, he never
visited India. He was rather contemptuous about
Third World participation at Bretton Woods, and
there is no great evidence, apart from the problems of
colonial finance, that he took any interest in what we
now call development problems or developing
countries. Keynes himself is therefore innocent of any
attempt to apply his framework, directly or in adjusted
form, to developing countries. That was a matter for
his followers, particularly Harrod and Domar in their
successful attempt to extend Keynesianism beyond
short-term statics, and to convert it into a long-term
and dynamic view, to show what happens to an
economy after it has achieved full employment in the
process of its subsequent growth. So it was those who
followed Keynes, particularly in the 1950s, who tried
to apply Keynesianism as such to conditions of
developing countries.
The moment this was done, immediate doubts arose
whether this was a proper approach. Dudley Seers was
among those who argued from the very beginning that
this was not a proper approach - that the England of
1936 was 'a special case', different from that of the
developing countries. He tried to develop a better
model, which would suit the conditions of developing
countries, by treating them as part of an international
periphery - the centre/periphery view. Rather
interestingly Dudley Seers then went a step further. In
several quotations from his last book it is clear that his
mind was moving in the direction of thinking that the
insights that he or others had gained, in different ways,
about the problems of developing countries, could be
transferred back to the industrial countries, and would
be very helpful in dealing with our own development
problems. Such reverse transfers would include ideas
of appropriate technology, the informal sector, the
role of transnational corporations, dealing with
depressed areas and economic inequalities, etc.
Indeed, if Dudley had lived longer. I think he would
have expanded this line of thought, applying the
insights gained by studying development problems to
the problems of industrial countries.
Let me now come back to something I said before
about Keynes, i.e. that he was not interested in
developing countries. It is true that his ideas as he put
them forward in 1936 taken superficially were not
relevant for developing countries. For instance,
V. K. R. V. Rao, his favourite Indian student in
Cambridge, on his return to India published a famous
article in the Indian EconomicRevieii' in which he gave
us all the reasons why, in spite of being a great admirer
and loyal student of Keynes, he thought Keynes' views
were not applicable to India. Rao gave four main
reasons which are still important today, although they
have since been added to, and in some cases
questioned and amended. These four reasons were as
follows:
First, the type of unemployment that is found in
developing countries is so different from that in
industrial countries that the problem is not job
creation. Of course, it should be remembered that Rao
wrote this in 1950, with India in mind, when India was
still largely an agricultural country, and most
developing countries were strongly identified with
agriculture. So naturally he said that the prevailing
type of employment is self-employment, either in
agriculture or in what we now call the urban informal
sector; hence the idea of job creation governing the
approach to improved employment or full employment
which Keynes put before us in 1936, is not applicable.
Secondly, Rao maintained that the problem in
developing countries is not, as Keynes described it, a
problem of effective demand, of demand deficiency. It
is essentially a problem of supply inelasticity. The
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problems are on the supply side. If you just try to inject
additional demand you immediately come up against
what we would call vertical supply curves, reflecting
structural rigidities in supply, particularly in food
production, the most important wage good. This
makes it impossible to carry out Keynesian policies,
which, Rao thought, would in India only lead to wild
inflation without resulting in much increase in
production.
The third (and clearly related) reason which Rao gave
was that Keynes had argued his case in the midst of the
world recession for an economy like England which
had not only unemployed labour, but also ample
underutilised capital and underutilised capacity in all
industries. Therefore, the job of bringing unemployed
labour and unused capacity together was much easier
than the quite different task presented in developing
countries. To put it in terms of the criticism
subsequently made by Kalecki and Joan Robinson,
Keynes thought he could solve the problems by purely
financial tricks: 'turning stones into bread'. In
developing countries, however, there may also be
latent capacity underutilisation. Rao would probably
be criticised today for denying the existence of such
latent capacity. At the same time as Rao was writing in
India, Ragnar Nurkse, in America, was showing
perhaps more insight on this point. While he agreed
with Rao that there may be no open unutilised capacity
or unused capital of the type found in an industrial
economy in recession (at least under normal
conditions and in the absence of balance of payments
constraint), there is nevertheless a lot of latent
capacity, e.g. agricultural surplus population, which
can be mobilised by the right policies, albeit not
necessarily simply by a financial trick. Schumpeter
thought that the development of entrepreneurship
could do it. Other people thought improved
technological capacity in developing countries could
do it. Nurkse thought (Rosenstein-Rodan having
blazed the trail here) that the big push or balanced
growth could do it, perhaps by mobilising the latent
power of reciprocal demand and external economics.
But at any rate, Rao, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse and
all the others who followed them would all agree that
the situation is different in developing countries; what
is needed is a more complex and difficult policy than
the largely monetary and financial policies which
Keynes suggested. Budget deficits, cheap money -
these things would not by themselves do the trick in
developing countries, as they might well do in
industrial countries with unemployment.
Finally, the fourth point which Rao made very
strongly, a point subsequently also modified in the
development discussion, was that Keynes assumed
that there was an ample supply of working capital to
support an increase in production; this again was not
the case in developing countries.
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So at this superficial level (using the word not in a
derogatory sense), one might say that Keynes was not
very relevant to developing countries and that the
critics, including Dudley Seers, of a transfer of simple
Keynesianism to developing countries, were absolutely
justified. But having said that, one or two important
qualifications have to be made.
The Relevance of Keynes
The first qualification is that so far we have been
talking only of the Keynes of 1936, the Keynes of the
General Theory. When I said Keynes was not directly
concerned with the problems of developing countries,
there was one major exception to this. He was, since
the 1930s, an ardent supporter of commodity price
stabilisation, through intervention in international
commodity markets. He followed up the General
Theory with a 1938 article in the Economic Journal,
advocating a policy of government storage of raw
materials. In the middle of the war in 1942 when the
war situation was very grim, he found the time to write
a memorandum for the War Cabinet in which he said
that the most important measure for the post-war
world was the creation of an international commodity
stabilisation agency. Then at Bretton Woods, he
proposed the International Trade Organisation (ITO),
as the third pillar of the Bretton Woods system, in
addition to the World Bank and IMF. He had set his
heart on this. Unfortunately the ITO was never
ratified.
Keynes went a lot further: he wanted an IMF which
would put pressure not on balance of payments deficit
countries but on balance of payments surplus
countries. This fitted in perfectly with his views
developed for the domestic economy in the General
Theory. He wanted a world currency that would be
based on 30 primary commodities rather than on gold
alone (gold would have been one of the 30) - not on
sterling, not on the dollar, not on SDRs, but on 30
primary commodities, so that commodity stabili-
sation would be built into the world monetary system.
In his vision of the world the balance of payments
limitation for economic development, for economic
expansion in developing countries, would be either
eliminated or very much reduced, opening the way for
his preferred inward-looking domestic expansion. So
if you define Keynesianism by adding to the 1936
General Theory the 1938 article on commodity
stabilisation and particularly Bretton Woods, then its
relevance and applicability to economic development
immediately becomes a lot more plausible.
But let me add that at an even more important
methodological level, in spite of apparent or
superficial reasons why Keynes was not particularly
relevant or directly suitable for developing countries,
the way of thinking which Keynes introduced into
economic analysis was also the foundation of
development economics. Albert Hirschman, in his
article 'The rise and decline of development
economics', wisely credits Keynes with taking the
decisive methodological step towards development
economics by replacing classical mono-economics by
duo-economics. Keynes was the creator of duo-
economics. His duo-economic model was based on the
proposition that when you have unemployment in an
industrial economic system, the economic interactions
and economic relations are fundamentally different
from those of an economy in full employment. Hence
the economic policies that are applicable to reduce
unemployment and restore full employment are
fundamentally different from those of running an
economy at full employment level. All subsequent
schools of development economics, even though they
may not have accepted the precise Keynesian model
and found (usually valid) reasons why it should not be
directly applicable to developing countries derive
from this decisive departure by Keynes that economics
is not a doctrine of universal validity, as the classical
economists more or less assume, but that there are
different economic laws or principles leading to
different economic policies for countries in different
conditions. The present neo-classical counter-
revolution is in essence a counter-revolution not
against planning, protectionism etc., but against the
principle of duo-economics and of a separate
discipline of development economics - although it is,
of course, perfectly possible for a genuine development
economist to be in favour of liberalisation, against
centralised planning etc.
A good example of this principle of duo-economics is
Keynes' advocacy, already discussed, of stabilisation
of primary commodity prices. For implicit in this
view, fervently held by Keynes, is the idea that
countries which depend on the production and export
of primary commodities are subject to different laws
and different trends and therefore require different
treatment and different policies from countries which
rely on the production and export of manufactured
goods. As we kndw, this idea was readily taken up by
Prebisch and others. Dudley Seers was, of course, one
of 'the others', and during his work with Prebisch at
ECLA the idea of duo-economics, in its sharp form of
centre/periphery analysis, became firmly embedded in
his thinking. His last writings, in fact, extended the
duo-economic centre/periphery model to the industrial
world and even to domestic problems within industrial
countries, providing a link between development
economics and the old concern about 'depressed
areas'. Rather ironically, though, his thinking led him
back to some new form of synthesis of mono-
economics and duo-economics, with the industrial
countries constituting a 'special case'.
Thus, although unemployment in developing countries
is of a different kind, and requires different
approaches from Keynesian policies as prescribed in
the General Theory, the idea of latent or disguised
unemployment, not only of labour but of other
resources, including capital, became a common
element in early thinking about development
problems and is still widespread today. Rather
interestingly, both the adherents of the school of
balanced economic growth and those of unbalanced
growth can claim descent from Keynes. The policy of
balanced growth is based on the idea that you cannot
rely on the market because it does not take account of
externalities, reciprocal demand and interaction
between sectors. What is not possible on an individual
enterprise or even sectoral basis becomes possjble on
an economy-wide or even better, global basis, through
macroeconomic synchronisation. This provided the
foundation for the tremendous popularity of
development planning in the 1950s, derived directly
from Keynes' General Theory. In this sense, he has
been incredibly influential in developing countries.
With the benefit of hindsight, many of us are now
more sceptical of the unqualified belief in planning,
and more specifically of the centralised planning
which the ideas of big push and balanced development
imply. But the more general idea that development to
an important extent is a matter of good macroeconomic
management, and that specifically the government of
a developing country has a great deal to contribute by
adopting the right policies, by taking account of
factors which individuals or individual enterprises
cannot take account of, still commands mainstream
support.
Similarly, and perhaps surprisingly, the opposite
theory of unbalanced growth, which was also very
influential in the formative period of development
economics, can also claim links with Keynes. Keynes
also tried to identify for the Britain of 1936 the key
points where public policy could, through multipliers
and interactions, have a maximum impact in pulling
the whole economic system along with it. This idea of
finding a leading element or leading sector, or
bottleneck sector, releasing some latent resources
which would otherwise lie idle has become a common
endeavour of many development practitioners and
economists. Some of the biggest success stories in
economic development may be due to the correct
identification of leading sectors, and effective action
based on such identification. On the other hand,
obsession with certain lead sectors, e.g. heavy
industry, to the neglect of others, e.g. agriculture, is
also held responsible for some of the failure. But our
point here is that this also is a direct part of the
Keynesian inheritance.
Seers' Criticisms of Keynes
There is one sense in which Dudley Seers took the
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Keynesian analysis a good deal further. He was not
alone in this, but he played a leading part. Let me come
back to a criticism, of Keynes' work, which was
already made in the 1930s, and even more so after the
war when ideas of the Welfare State and income
redistribution had become widespread, not only in the
industrial countries, but also in the developing
countries. That criticism alleges that Keynes was not
particularly interested in human welfare, that he
wanted economic growth mainly through the revival
of physical investment; that he did not care enough
what kind of investment ('digging holes and filling
them up again'); or who would benefit from the
investment; what would be the effect on income
distribution; what would be the impact on poverty, on
human welfare. There is some substance in such
criticism; in the General Theory we do not find much
explicit discussion of this. Against this, however, it can
be argued that the very fact that Keynes picked out
unemployment, which after all was the main cause of
poverty in the 1930s, as the chief objective to be
eliminated or reduced, shows a concern with poverty;
and also that full employment in itself will contribute
to more equal income distribution. But it is certainly
true that other elements of Keynesian policy might
increase inequalities of income distribution. He was
quite ready to accept, or even advocate, a reduction in
real wages of those in work as a necessary
precondition for the reduction of unemployment.
Certainly under his recipe for restoration of full
employment the share of profits in national income
would increase (as it does in related development
strategies based on the absorption of 'surplus labour').
So, to the extent that Keynes was not directly
concerned with welfare and income redistribution,
Dudley Seers' emphasis on life cycles and social
indicators represents an essential further development
and correction of the Keynesian approach. In a way
that was typical of him, Dudley developed his views
not theoretically, but as a result of field experience in
developing countries, particularly in the ¡LO
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Employment Missions. This choice of moving from
policy and reality to theory rather than the other way
is, I think, also shared with Keynes, who, in spite of
appearances to the contrary in the General Theory,
essentially did not believe in the primacy of theory. His
starting point was that the conventional classical view
clearly conflicted with reality. He looked at reality,
saw that it conflicted with theory, and then set about
revising theory. Dudley Seers, in his move from
concentration on growth and then employment in the
era of the ILO Employment Missions, to basic needs,
to poverty, to income distribution, was also influenced
not so much by theoretical thinking but by his life
experience, by what he observed. He then turned to
revise the models with which he worked.
In this article I have certainly not exhausted Keynes'
contribution to development thinking, nor Dudley's
role, even in relation to Keynes, but I hope that at least
some things which it contains will help to bring home
to us again the loss we have suffered in his death.
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